

## Message Text

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SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-05

AECE-00 /085 W

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P 131715Z NOV 74

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 613

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

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USCINCEUR PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 8 MBFR VIENNA 0412

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: INFORMAL SESSION WITH EASTERN REPS

NOVEMBER 12, 1974

REF: MBFR VIENNA 411

FOLLOWING IS CONTINUATION OF REPORT OF INFORMAL  
SESSION WITH EASTERN REPS ON NOVEMBER 12. PARAGRAPHS  
1 THROUGH 4 CONTAINING SUMMARY TRANSMITTED REFTEL.

5. GDR REP OESER AS HOST WELCOMED PARTICIPANTS. HE  
SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO START OFF WITH SOME COMMENTS  
DEALING WITH THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS IN THE LAST  
INFORMAL SESSION ON THE EAST'S PROPOSAL FOR AN INITIAL  
REDUCTION STEP. HE WISHED TO EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE

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THE EAST ATTACHED TO THIS PROPOSAL, TO WHICH A POSITIVE

REPLY FROM THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS WAS STILL NEEDED. THIS WAS BECAUSE A POSITIVE REACTION BY ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD DEMONSTRATE THEIR READINESS TO TAKE ACTUAL REDUCTION STEPS WHICH WOULD CONFORM TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MUTUALITY AND UNDIMINISHED SECURITY. THIS WOULD BE A PRACTICAL BEGINNING TO THE REDUCTION PROCESS AND FACILITATE THE SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS TO MORE SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS. THE SEARCH FOR A POSITIVE WESTERN REPLY SHOULD BE FACILITATED BECAUSE THE EAST HAD SERIOUSLY TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION THE WESTERN VIEWS AND HAD DISPLAYED UNDERSTANDING FOR MANY WESTERN POSITIONS. THIS HAD BEEN POSSIBLE BECAUSE OF THE GENERAL STRUCTURE OF THE EASTERN FIRST STEP AGREEMENT AS AN INDEPENDENT AND SEPARATE STEP NOT PREJUDICING THE WHOLE PROGRAM OF REDUCTIONS OF EITHER SIDE.

6. GDR REP SAID THAT AS CONCERNED THE QUESTION OF WHO SHOULD REDUCE THEIR FORCES FROM THE OUTSET, THE EAST HAD MET THE DESIRES OF THE WEST. THE EAST HAD PROPOSED THAT THE US AND USSR START THEIR REDUCTIONS IN 1975 AND THAT THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD START THEIR REDUCTIONS ONLY AFTER THE AGREED REDUCTIONS OF US AND SOVIET FORCES HAD BEEN CARRIED OUT. AS CONCERNED OTHER WESTERN REMARKS AND QUESTIONS ON THE PARTICIPATION OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN STATES, EASTERN REPS HAD SAID THAT THE US AND USSR SHOULD TAKE MOST OF THE REDUCTIONS. THE EAST HAD ALSO TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION THE ASPECT OF PHASING OF NEGOTIATIONS AND REDUCTIONS. CONTRARY TO ACTUAL CONTENT OF THE EASTERN PROPOSAL, THE WESTERN REACTION REMAINED NEGATIVE. WESTERN REPS USED THE BASELESS ARGUMENT THAT THE EASTERN PROPOSAL DID NOT CONTAIN ANYTHING NEW AND THAT THE EASTERN PROPOSAL DID NOT MEET THE ENTIRE PROGRAM OF THE WESTERN SIDE. HOWEVER, THE EASTERN POSITION AS REGARDS THE OVERALL WESTERN PROGRAM WAS WELL KNOWN. THAT PROGRAM WAS IN DIRECT CONTRADICTION TO THE AGREED PRINCIPLES OF MUTUALITY AND UNDIMINISHED SECURITY. THEREFORE, THAT PROPOSAL COULD NOT FORM A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS.

7. OESER SAID WESTERN CRITICISM UP TO NOW OF THE INITIAL REDUCTION STEP SHOWED A LACK OF UNDERSTANDING OF THE PRODUCTIVITY OF THIS IDEA. BECUASE OF THE NATURE OF THIS REACTION,

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EASTERN REPS HAD THE RIGHT TO ASK THEIR NEGOTIATING PARTNERS WHICH ELEMENTS OF THE EASTERN POSITION OF NOVEMBER 8 HAD BEEN TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION IN THE WESTERN APPROACH. THE ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION WAS UNFORTUNATELY AN EASY ONE -- NONE. WESTERN REPS CONTINUED TO SPEAK ONLY THE REDUCTION OF GROUND FORCES EVEN THOUGH THE AGREED SUBJECT MATTER OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WAS THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF AMRED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS. WESTERN REPS STILL INSISTED THAT

ONLY THE US AND USSR SHOULD REDUCE THEIR FORCES AND ON AN ASYMMETRICAL BASIS. WESTERN REPS STILL REFUSED THAT ALL PARTICIPANTS SHOULD UNDERTAKE EQUAL OBLIGATIONS. THE WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND CANADA DID NOT WANT TO UNDERTAKE ANY CONCRETE OBLIGATIONS ON REDUCTIONS. WESTERN REPS STILL CONTINUED TO PUT FORWARD THE PRECONDITION THAT A SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION OF SOVIET FORCES SHOULD TAKE PLACE IN ADVANCE OF COMMITMENTS BY OTHERS TO REDUCE. WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS STILL OPPOSED REDUCTIONS ON THE BASIS OF AN EQUAL NUMBER OR EQUAL PERCENTAGE AND DECLARED OPENLY THAT THEY WERE FOLLOWING THE AIM OF CHANGING THE EXISTING BALANCE OF FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE IN FAVOR OF THE WEST.

8. GDR REP CONTINUED THAT THIS WAS THE GENERAL PICTURE EASTERN REPS SAW. IN THIS PICTURE IT WAS DIFFICULT TO FIND EVIDENCE OF A WESTERN WILL TO FIND A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION. THESE OBSERVATIONS APPLIED BOTH TO THE GENERAL WESTERN APPROACH AND TO THE WESTERN REACTION TO THE EASTERN INITIAL REDUCTION STEP. A POSITIVE WESTERN REACTION TO THIS PROPOSAL WOULD BE VERY IMPORTANT AS A DEMONSTRATION OF WESTERN READINESS TO PARTICIPATE AT ALL IN THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS. THIS WOULD FINALLY DEMONSTRATE A READINESS TO REDUCE ARMED FORCES AND TO CONTRIBUTE TO STRENGTHENING EUROPEAN SECURITY.

9. GDR REP SAID THAT, IN THE LAST SESSION ON NOVEMBER 5, WESTERN REPS HAD PUT A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS TO EASTERN REPS ON THE INITIAL REDUCTION PROPOSAL. UNDER SOME CIRCUMSTANCES, THIS FACT COULD BE A WELCOME ONE. BUT AT THE SAME TIME, WESTERN REPS HAD EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THESE QUESTIONS SHOULD NOT IMPLY ANY SERIOUS INTEREST IN THE EASTERN PROPOSAL. THEREFORE, THESE QUESTIONS DID NOT MAKE CLEAR WHETHER THEY EVIDENCED ANY GENERAL READINESS TO TRY TO  
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COME TO AGREEMENT ON A FIRST STEP REDUCTION. IF THERE HAD BEEN CLARITY ON THE WESTERN SIDE ABOUT THE UNDERLYING MEANING OF THE EASTERN PROPOSAL, THE WEST'S WAY OF PUTTING QUESTIONS WOULD HAVE BEEN A DIFFERENT ONE. WHAT WAS THE MEANING OF QUESTIONS AS TO WHETHER IT WAS POSSIBLE TO EXTEND THE TIMING OF IMPLEMENTATION TO TWO OR MORE YEARS? QUESTIONS LIKE THIS DID NOT MAKE CLEAR WHETHER THE WEST WAS READY TO TAKE UP CONSIDERATION OF AN INITIAL STEP NOR DID THEY INDICATE THAT THE WEST REALIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE INITIAL STEP PROPOSAL.

10. OESER SAID LOOKING AT THESE WESTERN QUESTIONS RAISED THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE WEST WAS TRYING TO CONVERT THE EASTERN FIRST STEP PROPOSAL INTO THE WESTERN FIRST PHASE PROPOSAL, NOT ACTUALLY SPEAKING OF THE INITIAL REDUCTION STEP

PROPOSAL, BUT TRYING TO COME BACK TO THE ORIGINAL WESTERN PLAN WHICH PARTICIPANTS HAD DISCUSSED MANY TIMES BEFORE. THIS TACTIC REAISED A QUESTION AS TO THE WEST'S MOTIVES IN ASKING QUESTIONS ON THE FIRST STEP. HE WOULD LIKE TO HEAR AN EXPLANATION FROM WESTERN REPS OF THIS POINT. EASTERN REPS HAD ALREADY SHOWN IN DETAIL THAT IN THE FRAMEWORK OF A FIRST STEP AGREEMENT, THEY HAD TAKEN WESTERN INTERESTS INTO ACCOUNT AND HAD SHOWN FLEXIBILITY.

11. CANADIAN REP SAID THAT, AT THE LAST SESSION, AS GDR REP HAD JUST MENTIONED, WESTERN REPS HAD ASKED A NUMBER OF SPECIFIC QUESTIONS REGARDING THE EASTERN PROPOSAL. THE STATEMENT THE GDR REP HAD JUST GIVEN HAD REFERRED TO ONLY ONE OF THESE QUESTIONS. THE WESTERN PURPOSE IN ASKING THESE QUESTIONS HAD BEEN A CONSTRUCTIVE ONE. WITHOUT, OF COURSE, WISHING TO IMPLY THAT NEGATIVE WESTERN VIEWS ON THE ENTIRE EASTERN PROPOSAL HAD CHANGED IN ANY RESPECT AS REGARDS ITS ACCEPTABILITY AS A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION, WESTERN REPS WANTED TO EXPLORE ASPECTS OF THE EASTERN PROPOSAL WHICH TOUCHED ON TOPICS OF INTEREST TO THE WEST. EASTERN REPS THEMSELVES HAD URGED WEST TO DO THIS ON A NUMBER OF OCCASSIONS.

12. CANADIAN REP SAID THAT, UNLESS HE HAD MISUNDERSTOOD GDR REP, TOWARDS THE END OF HIS STATEMENT LATTER HAD SEEMED TO POSE THE SECRET

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PRECONDITION THAT WEST SHOULD ACCEPT THE EASTERN FIRST STEP PROPOSAL AS A BASIS OF NEGOTIATION BEFORE WEST HAD RIGHT TO ASK ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT IT, OR AT LEAST THAT IF WEST DID NOT ACCEPT THE EASTERN FIRST STEP PROPOSAL, BEFORE ASKING QUESTIONS, THE WESTERN QUESTIONS WOULD NOT BE WORTH ANSWERING IF THEY WERE NOT BASED ON THE EASTERN PROPOSAL AS IN THE EASTERN VIEW THEY SHOULD HAVE BEEN. HE BELIEVED ALL PARTICIPANTS WOLD AGREE THAT THE COURSE OF DISCUSSION IN THE INFORMAL SESSIONS DEMONSTRATED THAT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD NOT IMPOSE PRECONDITIONS. BOTH SIDES HAD ALWAYS MADE CLEAR THAT IN CONDUCTING THESE INFORMAL SESSIONS THEY WOULD NOT IMPOSE PRECONDITIONS AND BOTH SIDES HAD

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SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-05

AECE-00 /085 W

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P 131715Z NOV 74

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 614

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

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ALSO MADE CLEAR THAT THEY PRESERVED THEIR FUNDAMENTAL POSITION, AS IN THE LAST SESSION, WHEN WESTERN REPS HAD ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE LATEST EASTERN PROPOSAL.

13. CANADIAN REP SAID HE WOULD THEREFORE LIKE TO GO BACK TO THE SPECIFIC QUESTIONS THE ALLIES HAD ASKED AT LAST MEETING AND ASK EASTERN REACTION TO THEM. IF TIME PERMITTED, HE WOULD LIKE TO ASK SOME FURTHER QUESTIONS ON THE EASTERN FIRST STEP PROPOSAL. HE ASSUMED THIS PROCEDURE WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE EAST.

14. CANADIAN REP SAID  
ONE QUESTION ALLIED REPS HAD ASKED IN  
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THE PREVIOUS SESSION CONCERNED THE LENGTH OF THE IMPLEMENTATION PERIOD FOR REDUCTION. THIS HAD BEEN THE QUESTION GDR REP HAD REFERRED TO IN HIS OPENING REMARKS. EAST HAD PROPOSED THAT INITIAL REDUCTION BE IMPLEMENTED IN

TWO STAGES OVER A ONE-YEAR PERIOD. WEST HAD ASKED EAST

AT THE LAST MEETING WHETHER THIS PERIOD COULD BE EXTENDED. THERE HAD BEEN INFORMAL SUGGESTIONS FROM THE EASTERN SIDE THAT THIS PERIOD COULD BE EXTENDED UP TO TWO YEARS. WESTERN REPS HAD ASKED IN THE SAME CONNECTION WHETHER THIS PERIOD COULD BE LONGER THAN TWO YEARS AND WHAT WAS THE MAXIMUM PERIOD EAST COULD ENVISAGE.

15. CANADIAN REP CONTINUED THAT WESTERN REPS HAD ASKED OTHER QUESTIONS, INCLUDING WHETHER THE EAST WAS WILLING TO TAKE MORE REDUCTIONS THAN THE WEST. IN EARLIER DISCUSSIONS OF THE FIRST STEP PROPOSAL, EASTERN REPS HAD INDICATED THAT THE EAST WOULD NOT INSIST ON EQUAL NUMBER REDUCTIONS OF BOTH SIDES BUT MIGHT TAKE EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS. WESTERN REPS HAD HEARD SIMILAR INFORMAL COMMENTS ON THE PRESENT PROPOSAL. WAS THIS THE CASE? IN THIS CONTEXT, EAST HAD INDICATED IT WAS WILLING TO TAKE MORE REDUCTIONS IN THOSE TYPES OF FORCES WHERE EAST HAD SUPERIORITY. WAS THE EAST WILLING TO TAKE MORE REDUCTIONS THAN THE WEST? WOULD THE EAST BE PREPARED TO GO FURTHER AND TO CONSIDER REDUCTIONS IN THE PROPORTIONS THE WEST HAD SUGGESTED IN ITS PROPOSALS? THESE QUESTIONS HAD BEEN ASKED ON THE LAST OCCASION. THEY HAD BEEN SERIOUS QUESTIONS. PERHAPS EAST HAD NEEDED TIME FOR REFLECTION, BUT THE TIME TO ANSWER THEM WAS NOW.

16. GDR REP SAID EAST WAS NOT POSING ANY PRECONDITIONS FOR REPLY TO THE WESTERN QUESTIONS. RATHER, EASTERN REPS WANTED TO UNDERSTAND THE INTENTION OF THE WESTERN QUESTIONS. WHETHER THEY WERE POSED IN THE FRAMEWORK OF A FIRST STEP REDUCTION PROPOSAL OR REPRESENTED AN ATTEMPT TO TURN BACK THIS PROPOSAL TO THE WESTERN FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT CONCEPT.

17. CZECHOSLOVAK REP SAID HE WOULD ANSWER SOME OF THE  
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QUESTIONS POSED BY WESTERN REPS EARLIER IN THE PREVIOUS SESSION AND REPEATED BY CANADIAN REP ON THE PRESENT OCCASION. EASTERN REPS HOPED THE WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES WERE READY TO SEEK AGREEMENT ON AN INITIAL REDUCTION STEP. IT MIGHT BE USEFUL FOR HIM TO COMMENT ON THE QUESTIONS RAISED BY WESTERN REPS. THE FIRST QUESTION WAS WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO EXTEND THE PERIOD OF REDUCTIONS TO TWO YEARS OR MORE. IF IN ASKING THIS QUESTION, WESTERN REPS HAD HAD IN MIND THE INITIAL REDUCTION STEP EAST HAD PROPOSED AND THE SPECIFIC JUSTIFICATION FOR THIS WHICH EAST HAD PRESENTED, WHAT WOULD BE THE SENSE OF EXTENDING THE PERIOD OF

REDUCTION OF 20,000 MEN ON EACH SIDE BEYOND ONE YEAR?  
EASTERN REPS HAD BEEN SOMEWHAT TAKEN ABACK BY THE LACK OF  
LOGIC OF THIS WESTERN QUESTION. ONE THE ONE HAND  
EASTERN REPS HEARD FROM THE WEST THAT THE SCOPE OF INITIAL  
REDUCTIONS WAS TOO SMALL. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT SEEMED  
A CENTRAL TENDENCY ON THE WESTERN SIDE TO WISH TO DRAW OUT  
THE TIME OF IMPLEMENTATION. WITH SUCH AN APPROACH, THE  
CONCEPT OF A FIRST STEP LOST ITS MEANING AND DOUBT WAS  
CAST ON ALL DECLARATIONS OF DESIRE TO REACH RESULTS IN  
THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS IN A SHORT TIME.

18. CANADIAN REP SAID HE HAD NOT ONLY ASKED WHETHER EAST COULD  
ENVISAGE A TWO-YEAR IMPLEMENTATION PERIOD, BUT ALSO WHAT  
MAXIMUM PERIOD EAST COULD ENVISAGE. CZECHOSLOVAK REP  
REPLIED, ONE YEAR WAS ENOUGH. THIS REPEATED WESTERN  
QUESTION WAS NOT LOGICAL.

19. CZECHOSLOVAK REP SAID THE SECOND WESTERN QUESTION  
HAD BEEN, WOULD THE EAST BE PREPARED TO AGREE TO REDUCE  
IN THE PROPORTIONS SUGGESTED BY THE WEST. THE EASTERN  
REPLY WAS THAT EASTERN REPS FIRMLY HELD TO THE PRINCIPLE  
OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY AT EVERY POINT AND AT EVERY  
STAGE. EASTERN REPS THOUGHT THAT WESTERN COUNTRIES  
SHOULD ALSO HOLD TO THIS PRINCIPLE AND NOT TRY TO  
ATTAIN UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGE. THIS WAS THE  
ONLY BASIS ON WHICH TO REACH AGREEMENT. DURING THE  
PREPARATORY CONSULTATIONS, THE WESTERN DELEGATES HAD  
AFTER ALL AGREED TO DROP THE WORD "BALANCED"  
FROM THE TITLE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. NOTWITHSTANDING  
THEIR AGREEMENT TO THIS POINT, WESTERN DELEGATES WERE NOW  
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ADVANCING THE PRINCIPLE OF ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS, MEANING  
NOTHING MORE NOR LESS THAN BALANCED REDUCTIONS AS THE  
WEST HAD ORIGINALLY CONCEIVED THEM. EASTERN REPS CONSIDERED  
THIS AS AN EFFORT TO REVISE THE AGREED DEFINITION  
OF THE VERY SUBJECT MATTER OF THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS.

20. CANADIAN REP SAID HE WANTED TO GO BACK ON THE  
QUESTIONS ASKED BY ALLIED REPS IN THIS REGARD. HE HAD  
POINTED OUT THAT EASTERN REPS HAD PREVIOUSLY SAID THEY  
WERE WILLING TO REDUCE MORE OF THEIR FORCES WHERE THEY  
HAD MORE. THAT WAS WHY ALLIED REPS WERE ASKING WHETHER  
THE EAST WOULD TAKE MORE REDUCTIONS IN SUCH CASES IN THE  
INITIAL STEP PROPOSAL.

21. THIS QUESTION CAUSED A CONSULTATION AT THE TABLE AMONG  
THE EASTERN REPS. SMIRNOVSKY SAID THAT IN MAKING THE  
POINT REFERRED TO BY CANADIAN REP, EASTERN REPS HAD BEEN  
SPEAKING OF ALL FORCES IN THE AREA. IF ONE SIDE HAD LARGER

FORCES OF ONE KIND, IT WOULD REDUCE MORE FORCES OF THAT TYPE. IF THE OTHER SIDE HAD MORE FORCES OF ANOTHER KIND, IT WOULD REDUCE MORE FORCES OF THAT TYPE. THIS WAS IMPLIED IN THE EQUAL PERCENTAGE FEATURE OF THE NOVEMBER 8 PROPOSAL. US DEP REP ASKED WHETHER THAT STATEMENT WOULD APPLY TO THE INITIAL REDUCTION PROPOSAL. SMIRNOVSKY SAID THIS WAS A SPECIFIC AND INDEPENDENT PROPOSAL.

22. KHLESTOV SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO STATE FOR THE SAKE OF COMPLETE CLARITY THAT THE EASTERN POSITION HAD ALWAYS BEEN THAT THE EAST FAVORED EITHER EQUAL NUMBER OR EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS. THIS STILL REMAINED THE BASIC EASTERN POSITION. THE IMPLICATIONS AND CONSEQUENCES MIGHT BE DIFFERENT AS SMIRNOVSKY HAD JUST EXPLAINED. HOWEVER, THIS EXPLANATION SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED AS MEANING THAT THE EAST WOULD BE WILLING TO CARRY OUT REDUCTIONS IN A GREATER SCOPE THAN THE OTHER SIDE. ANOTHER ASPECT WAS THE PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THIS APPROACH. IF THE EQUAL PERCENTAGE APPROACH WERE APPLIED, ACTUAL REDUCTIONS RESULTING MIGHT BE DIFFERENT. BUT THIS PRINCIPLE SHOULD ALSO BE APPLIED ALONG WITH THE BASIC EASTERN POSITION THAT ALL FORCES IN THE AREA SHOULD BE REDUCED. AS FAR AS THE SPECIFIC QUESTIONS OF ALLIED REPS ON THE PRESENT OCCASION WAS CONCERNED,  
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EAST HAD MADE A SPECIFIC PROPOSAL. EAST HAD FORMULATED THIS PROPOSAL TAKING INTO ACCOUNT SOME ELEMENTS OF THE WESTERN APPROACH AND SOME ELEMENTS OF THE EASTERN APPROACH. AS EASTERN REPS SAW IT, THE OUTCOME WAS A BALANCED PROPOSAL. THEREFORE, THE NUMBERS THAT EAST HAD MENTIONED IN THIS PROPOSAL REFLECTED THIS GENERAL BALANCE.

23. US DEPREP SAID THAT KHLESTOV WAS NOT ANSWERING THE QUESTION POSED BY CANADIAN REP. EASTERN DRAFT PROPOSAL SUGGESTED THAT EITHER EQUAL NUMBERS OR EQUAL PERCENTAGES BE USED. COULD

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SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-05

AECE-00 /085 W

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P 131715Z NOV 74

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0615

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

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THIS CHOICE ALSO BE APPLIED TO THE PRESENT INITIAL  
REDUCTION PROPOSAL? KHLESTOV SAID EASTERN REPS HAD  
ALWAYS ADVOCATED THE EQUAL PERCENTAGE APPROACH FOR THE  
SUBSEQUENT STAGES OF THEIR NOVEMBER 8 PROPOSAL. IT STOOD  
TO REASON THAT THE EAST WAS PREPARED TO LISTEN TO THE  
VIEWS OF OTHERS ON THIS POINT IF PARTICIPANTS WERE  
SEEKING A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION.

23. FRG REP POINTED OUT THAT NOVEMBER 8 WARSAW PACT  
PROPOSAL DID NOT SPECIFY HOW THE FIRST STAGE REDUCTIONS  
WOULD BE DISTRIBUTED AMONG THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. AS  
FAR AS THE SIZE OF REDUCTIONS WAS CONCERNED, THE AMOUNT  
OF REDUCTIONS PROPOSED BY THE EAST FOR THEIR INITIAL  
REDUCTION STEP PROPOSAL WAS THE SAME AS THE FIRST STAGE  
OF THEIR NOVEMBER 8 PROPOSALS. WHERE WAS THE MOVEMENT  
FROM THAT ORIGINAL POSITION? THEREFORE, HE WOULD LIKE TO  
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REPEAT QUESTION OF CANADIAN REP, WHETHER UNDER THE FIRST  
STEP PROPOSAL THE EAST WAS PREPARED TO REDUCE MORE THAN THE  
WEST.

24. GDR REP CITED ARTICLE I OF THE EASTERN DRAFT AGREEMENT  
NOTING THAT IT PROVIDED FOR EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS.  
HE SAID THIS WAS THE GENERAL AND GOVERNING PRINCIPLE OF THE  
DRAFT AGREEMENT AND WAS VALID ALSO FOR ARTICLE 2 AND ACCORDINGLY  
REDUCTIONS UNDER STAGE ONE OF THAT DRAFT WERE INTENDED TO BE

DISTRIBUTED PRO RATA. IN THE CASE OF THE PRESENT EASTERN INITIAL REDUCTION STEP PROPOSAL, HOWEVER, EAST HAD PROPOSED EQUAL NUMBERS BECAUSE IT HAD CHANGED THE PROPORTION OF THE REDUCTIONS TO BE TAKEN BY EACH OF THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS FROM WHAT THEY WOULD HAVE HAD TO TAKE IF THE EQUAL PERCENTAGE APPROACH HAD BEEN APPLIED. EAST STARTED FROM THE POSITION THAT THERE WAS NOW A BALANCE OF FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND ALSO THAT IT WAS EASIER TO MAKE A FIRST STEP USING A FIXED NUMBER APPROACH. BUT IF THE WEST WAS MAKING A DIFFERENT PROPOSAL, EAST WOULD BE INTERESTED IN KNOWING WHAT NUMBERS WEST WOULD PROPOSE.

25. KHLESTOV SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO REFER TO FRG REP'S REMARKS THAT THE EAST HAD NOT SHOWN ANY FLEXIBILITY IN PROPOSING AN INITIAL REDUCTION STEP OF 20,000 ON EACH SIDE BECAUSE THESE NUMBERS WERE THE SAME AS IN THE FIRST STEP OF THE NOVEMBER 8 EASTERN PROPOSAL. AS FAR AS HE WAS CONCERNED, ANY MEASUREMENT OF FLEXIBILITY OR AN ATTEMPT TO FIND A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION SHOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES. EASTERN REPS HAD BORROWED THE FIGURE OF 20,000 ON EACH SIDE FOR THE FIRST INITIAL STEP REDUCTION FROM THEIR NOVEMBER 8 DRAFT BUT AS REGARDS THE DISTRIBUTION OF THESE REDUCTIONS, THE EASTERN REPS HAD ADOPTED THE WESTERN POSITION. THIS HAD ALSO BEEN THE CASE FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF SEPARATING THE US AND SOVIETS FROM REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AND HERE AGAIN THE EAST HAD SHOWN FLEXIBILITY. EAST HAD DEMONSTRATED READINESS TO HAVE THE US AND SOVIET UNION REDUCE FIRST AND THE OTHERS ONLY AFTER THESE REDUCTIONS. THIS WAS FLEXIBILITY. AS FAR AS SPECIFIC DISTRIBUTION OF THE AMOUNTS OF REDUCTIONS TO BE CARRIED OUT IN THE INITIAL STEP, THE EAST HAD AGAIN SHOWN

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FLEXIBILITY IN COMPARISON TO NOVEMBER 8. AS GDR REP HAD JUST EXPLAINED, IN THE EASTERN ORIGINAL PROPOSAL, DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WERE SUPPOSED TO SHARE IN THE REDUCTIONS IN PROPORTION TO THEIR SHARE OF THE ARMED FORCES OF EACH SIDE. NOW THE EAST WAS PROPOSING A DIFFERENT DISTRIBUTION. THE FRG WOULD TAKE LESS REDUCTIONS THAN ITS PROPORTION OF ITS TOTAL OF WESTERN FORCES. HERE, TOO, THE EAST HAD DEMONSTRATED FLEXIBILITY. THE EASTERN IDEA OF PHASING REDUCTIONS ALSO SHOWED FLEXIBILITY. SO AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE ONLY THING EAST HAD BORROWED FROM ITS NOVEMBER 8 PROPOSAL WAS THE IDEA THAT THERE SHOULD BE A REDUCTION OF 20,000 ON EACH SIDE. THE REMAINING ELEMENTS OF THE EASTERN PROPOSAL HAD BEEN TAKEN FROM THE WESTERN POSITION. THAT WAS THE EASTERN FLEXIBILITY.

26. US REP ASKED WHETHER THE PROPORTION OF SOVIET REDUCTIONS

TO BE TAKEN IN THE INITIAL REDUCTION STEP PROPOSAL WAS NOT THE SAME AS EAST HAD ENVISAGED FOR FIRST STAGE OF NOVEMBER 8 AGREEMENT. THE SOVIETS WOULD STILL BE TAKING THEIR PRO RATA SHARE -- 10,000 MEN OF THE 20,000 ON THE EASTERN SIDE. KHLESTOV SAID HE HAD NOT DISCUSSED THE AMOUNT OF SOVIET REDUCTIONS, ONLY FRG AND US REDUCTIONS. US REP SAID KHLESTOV HAD JUST SAID THAT THE ONLY POINT HE HAD BORROWED FROM THE NOVEMBER 8 FIRST STEP PROPOSAL WAS THE 20,000 FIGURE. HE SUGGESTED THAT KHLESTOV HAD ALSO BORROWED THE 10,000 FIGURE FOR SOVIET REDUCTIONS. KHLESTOV SAID HE HAD NOT MENTIONED THIS FIGURE. HE ONLY SAID THAT EAST HAD PROPOSED A FIGURE OF 20,000 MENTIONED IN ITS ORIGINAL PROPOSAL BECAUSE FRG REP HAD CLAIMED THAT THE USE OF THIS SAME NUMBER PROVED THAT THE EAST HAD SHOWN NO FLEXIBILITY IN ITS PROPOSAL AND HE HAD SHOWN EASTERN FLEXIBILITY ON FOUR SEPARATE POINTS. US REP SAID KHLESTOV WAS APPARENTLY NOT CLAIMING FLEXIBILITY AS REGARDS SOVIET REDUCTIONS BECAUSE THESE WOULD BE THE SAME AS CONTEMPLATED IN THE FIRST STAGE OF THE EASTERN NOVEMBER 8 PROPOSAL. KHLESTOV CONCEDED THE POINT.

27. CANADIAN REP SAID HE WANTED TO ASK THIS SAME QUESTION IN A DIFFERENT WAY. IN THE LAST SESSION, ALLIED REPS HAD NOTED THAT THE SHARE OF REDUCTIONS ON THE EASTERN SIDE UNDER THE INITIAL REDUCTION STEP PROCESS WOULD BE THE SAME AS  
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THE PRESENT RELATIONSHIP OF SOVIET TOTALS TO WARSAW PACT FORCES IN THE AREA. ALLIED REP HAD THEN GONE ON TO ASK WHETHER EAST COULD CONSIDER HAVING A LARGER SHARE OF REDUCTIONS THAN THIS AND WHETHER THE SOVIETS COULD TAKE ALL OF THE EASTERN REDUCTIONS UNDER THE INITIAL STEP PROPOSAL. THIS QUESTION WAS DIRECTLY RELATED TO WHAT US REP HAD JUST ASKED. ALLIED REPS WOULD LIKE AN EASTERN REACTION TO THIS REPEATED QUESTION.

28. CZECHOSLOVAK REP SAID THAT THE EASTERN REPS CONSIDERED THAT THE NEW PROPOSAL OF THE SOCIALIST STATES MET THE WISHES OF THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS TO A SUFFICIENT EXTENT. AT THE SAME TIME, THE CZECH, GDR AND POLISH REP EACH CONSIDERED IT OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE THAT THEIR COUNTRIES PARTICIPATE IN AN INITIAL REDUCTION STEP ALONG WITH THE OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. HE WOULD LIKE TO ASK ANOTHER QUESTION IN RETURN. WHY DID THE WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND CANADA EVADE SIMILAR PARTICIPATION IN REDUCTIONS? THE JUSTIFICATION FOR THE POSITION OF THE UK AND CANADA GIVEN BY THE UK

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REP IN HIS LAST PLENARY STATEMENT COULD HARDLY BE TAKEN  
AS A REASONABLE EXPLANATION.

29. CZECHOSLOVAK REP SAID THE LAST WESTERN QUESTION HAD  
CONCERNED THE QUOTA OF REDUCTIONS BY THE US AND USSR.  
BUT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO KNOW WHETHER THE OTHER WESTERN  
DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WERE SATISFIED WITH THE QUOTA FORESEEN  
FOR THEM UNDER THE EASTERN INITIAL STEP REDUCTION PROPOSAL.  
EASTERN REPS HAD HEARD NOTHING ON THAT POINT THUS FAR.  
EASTERN REPS FOUND IT HARD TO UNDERSTAND THE POSITION  
OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND CANADA SINCE THE  
INITIAL REDUCTION STEP COULD NOT IN ANY WAY ENDANGER  
THE SECURITY OF ANY OF THESE PARTICIPANTS NOR THEIR  
OVERALL POSITION IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS. HE WISHED TO  
APPEAL TO THE WESTERN REPS TO START ON A MUTUAL AND  
SERIOUS SEARCH FOR AN INITIAL REDUCTION STEP. US DEP

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SAID ALLIED REPS HAD NOTED THIS QUESTION.

30. CANADIAN REP SAID UK REP'S REMARKS WERE A CONSIDERED ANSWER OF THE ALLIES NOT BE TAKEN LIGHTLY. ALLIES CONSIDERED THIS POSITION VALID. AS FAR AS CANADA WAS CONCERNED, THE MAIN POINT WAS THE CONFIDENCE POINT, WHICH NEED NOT NOW BE DESCRIBED IN DETAIL NOW. THIS POINT HAD BEEN STATED AND RESTATED. IT HAD NOT BEEN ADVANCED MERELY FOR THE SAKE OF TALKING.

31. CANADIAN REP SAID GDR REP HAD JUST COMMENTED THAT THE WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WERE NOT READY TO UNDERTAKE A COMMITMENT TO REDUCE. TO THE CONTRARY. ALLIED REPS HAD SAID SINCE LAST JULY THAT THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS EXCEPT LUXEMBOURG WERE READY TO UNDERTAKE A COMMITMENT TO REDUCE BEFORE ANY SOVIET OR AMERICAN REDUCTIONS HAD TAKEN PLACE. AS HE HAD EARLIER POINTED OUT, THIS DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN BY ALL ALLIED GOVERNMENTS. CANADIAN REP SAID THAT, IN THIS CONTEXT, ANOTHER QUESTION WHICH HAD BEEN ASKED AT THE LAST MEETING WAS WHETHER THE EAST WAS PREPARED TO AGREE THAT US AND SOVIET REDUCTIONS TAKE PLACE BEFORE THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS DECIDED ON THE AMOUNT AND TIMING OF THEIR REDUCTION.

32. CZECHOSLOVAK REP SAID, AS REGARDS THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE US AND USSR SHOULD REDUCE THEIR FORCES WHILE OTHERS UNDERTOOK NO COMMITMENT ON THE SCOPE AND TIMING OF THEIR REDUCTIONS, AS FAR AS THE INITIAL STEP PROPOSAL WAS CONCERNED, THE EASTERN COUNTRIES HAD ALREADY MET THE WISHES OF THE WEST ON THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET. THE CONCEPT OF THE SEPARATION OF OBLIGATIONS SIMPLY LOOKED LIKE THE WESTERN POSITION ALL OVER AGAIN. HE WISHED TO DRAW ATTENTION TO THE QUESTION HE HAD ALREADY RAISED, WHAT STEP WAS THE WEST READY TO MAKE WHICH TOOK ACCOUNT OF THE EASTERN POSITION? US REP POINTED OUT THAT CANADIAN REP HAD JUST EXPLAINED THE MOST IMPORTANT STEP THE WEST HAD TAKEN, NAMELY THAT THE WESTERN GOVERNMENTS WERE WILLING TO UNDERTAKE A COMMITMENT TO REDUCE BEFORE THE US AND SOVIETS HAD ACTUALLY REDUCED. NOW THAT THE WEST HAD MADE THIS MOVE, THE QUESTION WAS WHETHER THE EAST WOULD NOT MOVE HALF  
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WAY BY AGREEING THAT SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS ON TIMING AND NUMBERS OF REDUCTIONS COULD FOLLOW INITIAL US/SOVIET REDUCTIONS RATHER THAN PRECEDE THEM.

33. GDR REP SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO MAKE TWO REMARKS ON THIS POINT. AS REGARDS WESTERN WILLINGNESS TO UNDERTAKE SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS, HE HAD STATED IN HIS OPENING REMARKS THAT THE WEST EUROPEANS WERE NOT READY TO TAKE CONCRETE OBLIGATIONS ON THE AMOUNT AND TIMING OF THEIR REDUCTIONS. CANADIAN REP SIAD ALLIED REPS CONSIDERED THE FACT THAT THEY WERE WILLING TO UNDERTAKE A SPECIFIC COMMITMENT TO REDUCE WAS IN FACT A CONCRETE OBLIGATION. EAST WANTED WEST TO GO FURTHER AND TO UNDERTAKE SPECIFIC DETAILED OBLIGATIONS. GDR REP SAID THAT THE WESTERN COMMITMENT CONTAINED NO TIME ELEMENT. EAST WANTED TO KNOW WHETHER THE WEST WOULD MAKE GOOD ON THIS OBLIGATION DURING THIS CENTURY. IT WAS NO REAL OBLIGATION. EASTERN REPS DID NOT SEE ANY CHANGE IN THE WESTERN POSITION FROM WHAT WEST HAD SAID AT THE OUTSET OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. IT WAS NOW MERELY BEING PRESENTED IN A DIFFERENT WAY. BUT THE CONTENT WAS THE SAME. THIS WAS THE POINT OF THE INITIAL STEP PROPOSAL. THIS PROPOSAL MADE IT EASIER FOR ALL PARTICIPANTS TO UNDERTAKE SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS. THEREFORE, THE QUESTION TO OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WAS EVEN MORE JUSTIFIED AS TO WHETHER THEY WERE NOW READY TO UNDERTAKE SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS AS REGARDS THE SCOPE AND TIMING OF THEIR REDUCTIONS.

34. US DEP REP ASKED WHETHER ONE PURPOSE OF THE EASTERN INITIAL REDUCTION STEP PROPOSAL THEN, WAS TO ENABLE OTHER WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO UNDERTAKE SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS AS TO AMOUNT AND TIMING OF REDUCTIONS BEFORE ANY REDUCTIONS BY ANY DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WAS CARRIED OUT. GDR REP SAID, YES. EASTERN REPS HAD MADE THIS VERY POINT FROM THE BEGINNING. THEY HAD POINTED OUT IT WAS POSSIBLE FOR ALL PARTICIPANTS TO BE FLEXIBLE IN THIS FRAMEWORK WHICH ENABLED ALL PARTICIPANTS TO MOVE AND TO TAKE A STEP WITH NO PREJUDICE TO THEIR OVERALL PROGRAM. HE WISHED TO ASK WHEN THE OTHER WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE READY TO MOVE IN  
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ACCORDANCE WITH THE MUTUAL OBLIGATION TO REDUCE THEY HAD UNDERTAKEN DURING THE PREPARATORY TALKS.

35. FRG REP SAID WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS HAD ONLY UNDERTAKEN COMMITMENT TO BE POTENTIAL PARTICIPANTS IN POSSIBLE AGREEMENTS, DURING THE PREPARATORY TALKS. SMIRNOVSKY SAID, THEN THE SOVIET UNION TOO WAS ONLY A POTENTIAL PARTICIPANT IN FUTURE AGREEMENTS AND HAD NO MORE OBLIGATION TO REDUCE FIRST THAN THE OTHERW. FRG REP SAID ALLIED REPS HAD INDICATED THAT THE FINAL

OUTCOME OF THE REDUCTION PROCESS WOULD BE. ALL WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, EXCEPT LUXEMBORG, HAD COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO REDUCE. WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS HAD OFFERED A NO INCREASE COMMITMENT FOR THE PERIOD BETWEEN THE PHASES. THESE COMMITMENTS WERE MUCH BIGGER IN SIZE THAN THE SMALL FRAMEWORK OF 20,000 REDUCTION PROPOSED BY THE EAST FOR THE INITIAL REDUCTION STEP.

36. GDR REP SAID HE HAD A QUESTION IN THIS CONTEXT. ALLIED REPS HAD SAID THEY WERE READY TO UNDERTAKE AN OBLIGATION MUCH HIGHER THAN 20,000. IF SO, WHAT PROPORTION OF REDUCTION WERE THE REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS READY TO UNDERTAKE IN THE INITIAL STEP?

37. CANADIAN REP SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO ASK TWO OR THREE FURTHER QUESTIONS IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE EASTERN PROPOSAL. ALLIED REPS WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHETHER THE EAST CONTEMPLATED UNDER THE FIRST PHASE REDUCTION STEP THAT PARTICIPANTS WOULD UNDERTAKE A COMMITMENT TO RESPECT RESIDUAL LEVELS OF MANPOWER IN THE AREA AND IF THESE RESIDUAL LEVELS WOULD BE EXPRESSED

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IN NUMERICAL TERMS. SECOND, AS TO THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF REDUCTION THE EAST WAS PREPARED TO TAKE IN THE INITIAL REDUCTION STEP, THE EAST HAD PROPOSED 20,000. WAS THIS A CEILING FOR EASTERN REDUCTIONS OR WOULD THE EAST TAKE MORE? WHAT WAS THE MAXIMUM NUMBER THE EAST WOULD ENVISAGE FOR ITS REDUCTION?

38. GDR REP SAID THE EAST HAD ALREADY SAID IN ITS DRAFT AGREEMENT THAT IT WAS READY TO REDUCE 15 PERCENT. EAST HAD LEARNED FROM THE WEST THEY WERE READY TO REDUCE 29,000 SOLDIERS. IT HAD HEARD NOTHING ELSE ABOUT THE SCOPE OF WESTERN REDUCTIONS. DID THESE REMARKS MEAN THAT THE WEST WAS READY TO REDUCE MORE THAN THE 20,000 PROPOSED BY THE EAST? FRG REP SAID THE QUESTION WAS WHAT WAS THE TOP REDUCTION THE EAST CONTEMPLATED TAKING FOR ITSELF UNDER ITS INITIAL REDUCTION STEP PROPOSAL.

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39. SOVIET REP SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO COMMENT ON TWO POINTS RAISED BY THE CANADIAN REP. THE FIRST WAS THE QUESTION OF WHAT KIND OF COMMITMENTS DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD ASSUME. IN THIS MATTER, EASTERN REPS PROCEEDED FROM THE DOCUMENTS ELABORATED IN THE PREPARATORY CONSULTATIONS AND THE PRINCIPLES AGREED ON AT THAT TIME, ESPECIALLY THAT OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY. IT WAS ABSOLUTELY CLEAR FOR EAST THAT DIRECT PARTICIPANTS ENJOYED EQUAL RIGHTS AND HAD EQUAL OBLIGATIONS. FOR THREE AND A HALF MONTHS DURING THE PREPARATORY CONSULTATIONS PARTICIPANTS HAD DELIBERATED AND EVEN FOUGHT

OVER THE ISSUE OF WHO WOULD BE A DIRECT PARTICIPANT. FINALLY, IT HAD BEEN AGREED THAT THERE WOULD BE 11 DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. THESE HAD BEEN DESCRIBED IN THE FINAL

COMMUNIQUE AS POTENTIAL PARTICIPANTS IN FUTURE AGREEMENTS. IT THEREWITH BECAME CLEAR THAT THESE PARTICIPANTS WOULD PARTICIPATE IN REDUCTIONS AND THEIR ARMED FORCES WOULD BE THE OBJECT OF REDUCTION WHEN THESE WERE CONSIDERED. SO IT WAS ABSOLUTELY CLEAR THAT IN THOSE THREE MONTHS OF PREPARATORY CONSULTATIONS IT HAD BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WERE THOSE WHO WOULD IN FACT PARTICIPATE IN REDUCTION OF FORCES. ALL PARTICIPANTS REALIZED THAT PARTICIPANTS WITH SPECIAL STATUS WOULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE REDUCTIONS PROCESS.



IF THERE HAD BEEN NO SUCH UNDERSTANDING AS HE HAD DESCRIBED, THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN NO POINT IN THE LONG DEBATE WHICH HAD TAKEN PLACE ON THIS SUBJECT.

40. KHESTOV SAID IT WAS NOT SIGNIFICANT WHETHER ONE CALLED THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS POTENTIAL PARTICIPANTS IN FUTURE AGREEMENTS OR FUTURE PARTICIPANTS IN POTENTIAL

AGREEMENTS. AS LONG AS NO AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED, THE WORDS POTENTIAL AND FUTURE AMOUNTED TO THE SAME THING. BUT FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF UNDERSTANDING THE FACTS, THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WERE THOSE COUNTRIES WHICH WOULD PARTICIPATE IN REDUCTIONS. THIS VIEW WAS SUBSTANTIATED AMONG OTHER THINGS BY THE UNILATERAL STATEMENT  
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MADE BY AMBASSADOR QUARLES ON MAY 14. LATTER HAD MADE CLEAR IN HIS STATEMENT THAT THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE THOSE PARTICIPATING IN REDUCTIONS. NO DIRECT PARTICIPANT COULD BE RELIEVED OF THE OBLIGATION TO REDUCE EXCEPT ON THE BASIS OF REASONS ACCEPTED BY ALL THE OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AS VALID EXCEPTIONS. FROM THIS IT WAS LOGICALLY EVIDENT THAT DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD HAVE COME TO VIENNA WITH A WILL AND AN OBLIGATION TO PARTICIPATE IN REDUCTIONS. POLITICALLY, IN VIEW OF THE SUBJECT MATTER AND THE AGREEMENT THAT REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE MUTUAL, THE ASSUMPTION ONCE AGAIN WAS

THAT ALL SHOULD PARTICIPATE. THE SUBJECT OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS WAS NOT UNILATERAL REDUCTION BUT MUTUAL REDUCTIONS. THEREFORE, HE FOUND IT RATHER STRANGE, AFTER THE FOUR SOCIALIST DIRECT PARTICIPANTS STATED THEY WERE READY TO PARTICIPATE IN REDUCTIONS, TO HEAR SOME WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS STATE THAT THEY WERE NOT READY TO DO THE SAME.

41. KHESTOV CONTINUED THAT, THEREFORE, WHEN THE EAST HEARD WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SAY THEY HAD MADE A STEP FORWARD BY ASSUMING THE OBLIGATION TO REDUCE IN THE FUTURE, THIS WAS NOT TO BE REGARDED AS A SIGNIFICANT STATEMENT. SECOND, THIS STATEMENT IN ANY EVENT DEALT WITH A DIFFERENT ASPECT OF THE ISSUE THAN THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET. THE QUESTION NOW BEFORE PARTICIPANTS WAS NOT THE QUESTION WHO SHOULD ASSUME FROM THE OUTSET AN OBLIGATION TO REDUCE HIS FORCES. IF PARTICIPANTS HAD BEEN DISCUSSING THAT QUESTION, IT WOULD BE A DIFFERENT MATTER. INSTEAD, PARTICIPANTS

WERE DISCUSSING THE QUESTION OF WHO SHOULD  
REDUCE HIS FORCES FROM THE OUTSET, NOT WHO SHOULD  
UNDERTAKE A COMMITMENT TO DO SO. THEREFORE, WHAT  
WESTERN REPS HAD SAID ON THIS PINT DID NOT CHANGE  
THE ORIGINAL WESTERN POSITION ON THIS SUBJECT WHICH  
WAS AND REMAINED THAT ONLY US AND USSR SHOULD REDUCE  
FROM THE OUTSET. THEREFORE, BECAUSE THERE HAD BEEN  
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NO CHANGE IN THE ORIGINAL WESTERN REPLY TO THIS QUESTION,  
THERE HAD BEEN SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES IN REACHING AN  
UNDERSTANDING ON AN OVERALL AGREEMENT.

42. KHESTOV SAID THAT, FOR THIS REASON THE EAST HAD  
MADE A PROPOSAL FOR AN INITIAL REDUCTION STEP WHICH TOOK  
INTO ACCOUNT ELEMENTS OF THE WESTERN POSITION AND THE  
EASTERN POSITION. WESTERN CRITICISM ONLY INDICATED THE  
WEST'S BELIEF THAT THIS HAD NOT BEEN DONE TO A SUFFICIENT  
EXTENT. BUT THERE WAS NO DENYING THAT CERTAIN ELEMENTS OF  
THE WESTERN POSITION HAD BEEN TAKEN OVER. MOREOVER, THE  
EAST HAD NOT ONLY PROPOSED A SOLUTION WHICH TOOK INTO ACCOUNT  
WESTERN VIEWS, BUT HAD ALSO PROPOSED ONE WHICH DID NOT  
ESTABLISH ANY PRECEDENT OR PREJUDICE FOR THE OVERALL  
POSITION OF BOTH SIDES. THE EAST HAD BEEN FULLY AWARE  
THAT SUCH AN INITIAL STEP DID NOT REFLECT OVERALL  
PROGRAM OF EITHER SIDE. THE INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE  
OF NEGOTIATIONS POINTED TO SEVERAL CASES WHERE DECISIONS  
HAD BEEN ELABORATED WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE BASIC  
POSITIONS OF THE PARTICIPANTS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE DECEMBER  
1959 ANTARCTIC TREATY, IN WHICH SUCH NATO MEMBERS AS US,  
UK AND NORWAY PARTICIPATED CONTAINED A CLAUSE WHICH INDICATED  
THAT THE SOLUTIONS FOUND FOR THE PURPOSE OF THAT AGREEMENT  
DID NOT PREJUDICE THE BASIC POSITION OF THE PARTICIPANTS.  
THEREFORE, IT WAS CLEAR BOTH THAT THE INITIAL REDUCTION AGREEMENT  
TOOK INTO ACCOUNT THE INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES AND PROTECTED  
THEIR POSITIONS.

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SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

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43. KHLESTOV SAID THAT THE QUESTION POSED BY ALLIED REPS ELICITED THE FOLLOWING COMMENT: EASTERN REPS COULD CLEARLY SEE THAT SOME OF THE WESTERN QUESTIONS WERE DESIGNED TO CONVERT THE CONTENT OF THE EASTERN INITIAL REDUCTION PROPOSAL INTO THE FIRST PHASE OF THE OVERALL WESTERN PROGRAM. WESTERN REPS WERE AWARE OF THE EASTERN CRITICISM OF THE WESTERN TWO-PHASE PROGRAM, ESPECIALLY THE FIRST PHASE. EAST HAD ADVANCED CONVINCING ARGUMENTS SHOWING THAT THE WESTERN PHASE I PROPOSAL CONFLICTED WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY AND WAS DESIGNED TO SECURE UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE FOR THE WEST. THE EASTERN ATTITUDE TO THIS PROPOSAL WAS SUFFICIENTLY CLEAR. SO FAR EASTERN REPS HAD NOT HEARD ANY ADDITIONAL ARGUMENTS WHICH WOULD ENABLE THEM TO CHANGE THEIR INITIAL EVALUATION OF THE WESTERN PHASE I PROPOSAL. AS FAR AS THE EAST'S OWN INITIAL REDUCTION STEP PROPOSAL WAS CONCERNED, EAST HAD TRIED TO MAKE IT A BALANCED PROPOSAL DESIGNED TO TAKE IN

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ELEMENTS OF BOTH SIDES. AS AN EXAMPLE, THE

EAST HAD BORROWED THE FIGURE OF 20,000 REDUCTIONS ON EACH SIDE FROM ITS OWN ORIGINAL PROPOSAL. BUT THE EAST HAD BORROWED THE IDEA OF DIVIDING PARTICIPANTS INTO TWO CATEGORIES FROM THE WEST. IT STOOD TO REASON AS FAR AS PROPOSALS OF THIS COMPROMISE TYPE WERE

CONCERNED THAT THE ORIGINATORS TRIED TO MAKE THEM AS BALANCED AS POSSIBLE. THEREFORE, A CHANGE IN ELEMENTS OF POSITION OF ONE SIDE SHOULD ALWAYS ALSO REQUIRE A CHANGE IN THE POSITION OF THE OTHER SIDE.

SO EVERYTHING DEPENDED ON HOW THE WEST CHANGED OR DEALT WITH ELEMENTS WHICH HAD BEEN INCORPORATED IN THE EASTERN PROPOSAL. THE EAST HAD DRAWN ON THE WESTERN POSITION. THE WEST WAS NOW ASKING THE EAST HOW FAR THE EAST WAS ABLE TO CHANGE THE ELEMENTS IT HAD TAKEN FROM ITS OWN POSITION. BUT THE REAL QUESTION WAS HOW THE WEST WOULD SUGGEST CHANGING THE ELEMENTS OF THE EASTERN INITIAL STEP REDUCTUON PROPOSAL. HE HAD ASSUMED THAT THE NEED OF PARTICIPANTS TO SEEK SPECIFIC SOLUTIONS ON SPECIFIC STEPS WAS ACCEPTED BY ALL. SEVERAL WESTERN QUESTIONS ABOUT THE EASTERN INITIAL REDUCTION STEP PROPOSAL WERE ON HOW THE EAST WOULD IMPLEMENT THE PROPOSAL. HOWEVER, SOME ASPECTS OF THE PROPOSAL HAD NOT BEEN WORKED OUT. THIS SHOULD BE DONE AS A RESULT OF MUTUAL EFFORTS BY BOTH SIDES. THEREFORE, WHEN ALLIES REPS ASKED EAST HOW INITIAL STEP PROPOSAL COULD BE CHANGED, IT WAS DIFFICULT TO GIVE AN ANSWER RIGHT AWAY. ALL OF THESE DETAILS COULD BE ELABORATED DURING THE SEARCH FOR A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION. SO IT WAS DIFFICULT TO REPLY NOW TO SOME OF THE WESTERN QUESTIONS. KHLESTOV SAID THAT THEREFORE, HE COULD MAKE ONLY AN INITIAL COMMENT ON ANOTHER QUESTION WEST HAD RAISED. CANADIAN REP HAD ASKED ABOUT THE LEVELS TO BE MAINTAINED AFTER REDUCTIONS HAD BEEN TAKEN ON INITIAL REDUCTION STEP. THE TEXT OF THE EASTERN PROPOSAL ON THE INITIAL REDUCTION STEP DID NOT CONTAIN A REPLY TO THAT QUESTION. THE GENERAL EASTERN VIEW WAS THAT ONCE PARTICIPANTS HAD REDUCED THEIR FORCES, THEY SHOULD NOT INCREASE THEM.

WESTERN SUGGESTION FOR AN EXCHANGE OF DATA AND NOTED THAT THIS DISCUSSION COULD, OF COURSE, TAKE PLACE CONCURRENTLY WITH DISCUSSION OF OTHER TOPICS BEFORE THE  
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TWO SIDES. FRG REP SAID HE WANTED TO STRESS THE POINT THE ALLIED REPS HAD MADE IN THE LAST SESSION THAT THE WEST WAS READY TO EXCHANGE TOTALS ON ALL ARMED FORCES MANPOWER IN THE AREA, OF COURSE WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE NAVY. THIS MEANT THE WEST WAS WILLING, ON A RECIPROCAL BASIS, TO DISCUSS AIR MANPOWER AS WELL AS GROUND FORCE MANPOWER DATA WITH THE EAST. FRG REP SAID IT SHOULD NOW BE CLEAR TO THE EAST, THEREFORE THAT THE EAST WOULD NOT BE PREJUDICING ITS POSITION ON WHAT FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED BY ENGAGING IN SUCH A DISCUSSION. THE WEST, OF COURSE, MAINTAINED ITS POSITION THAT ONLY GROUND FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED. THE ALLIED REPS UNDERSTAND THAT THE EAST MAINTAINED ITS POSITION THAT ALL FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED.

45. FRG REP SAID THAT THE EASTERN SIDE HAD CHALLENGED WESTERN DATA. THE EASTERN REPS HAD SAID THAT THE WEST'S FIGURES WERE WRONG BUT HAD NOT SAID HOW THEY THOUGHT THE FIGURES WERE WRONG. IF THE EASTERN SIDE WAS CONFIDENT THAT ITS FIGURES WERE BETTER THAN THE WEST'S, THEN THE ALLIES DID NOT UNDERSTAND WHY THE EAST SHOULD BE UNWILLING TO DEMONSTRATE IT BY GIVING THE EAST'S FIGURES TO THE WEST AND DISCUSSING THE REASONS FOR THE DISCREPANCY. THE WESTERN REPS THOUGHT THAT THE GROUND FORCE TOTALS THEY HAD GIVEN THE EAST, SUBJECT TO THE UPDATING THE WEST HAD TOLD THE EAST ABOUT ON OCTOBER 29, WERE CORRECT. BUT THE WEST AND DEMONSTRATED ITS GOOD FAITH, FIRST, BY GIVING THE WESTERN TOTALS TO THE EAST; SECOND, BY EXPRESSING WILLINGNESS TO ADJUST THE WESTERN GROUND FORCE DEFINITION; THIRD, BY TELLING THE EAST THAT THE ALLIES WOULD BE WILLING TO ADJUST THEIR FIGURES IF IN THE COURSE OF DISCUSSION THE EAST PRODUCED OBJECTIVE EVIDENCE THAT THE FIGURES WERE INACCURATE; AND FOURTH, BY SAYING THAT THE WEST WAS WILLING TO INCLUDE DATA ON ALL ARMED FORCES MANPOWER IN THE AREA. AS REGARDS THE WESTERN STATEMENT THAT THE ALLIES WERE WILLING TO MODIFY THEIR DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES IN THE INTERESTS OF REACHING AGREEMENT ON A COMMON DEFINITION, WESTERN REPS HAD TOLD THE EAST THAT THEY WERE WILLING TO EXCLUDE A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF PERSONNEL FROM THE WEST'S TOTAL FOR THE WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCES, NAMELY,

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ALL THOSE PERSONNEL OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK AND POLISH TERRITORIAL AIR DEFENSE FORCES WHO MANNED AND OPERATED SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE LAUNCHERS AND ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY WEAPONS AND ASSOCIATED ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT AND THE PERSONNEL WHO SUPERVISED OR SUPPORTED THEM. FROM THE EASTERN REPS' OWN DATA THEY COULD CONFIRM THAT THIS WAS IN FACT A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER, EVEN AFTER TAKING

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FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0619

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

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FROM US REP MBFR

ACCOUNT OF WARSAW PACT GROUND SUPPORT HELICOPTER PERSONNEL. MORE SPECIFICALLY, THE ALLIES HAD TOLD THE EASTERN REPS THAT IF THEY COULD PROVE TO THE WEST WITH OBJECTIVE EVIDENCE THAT WESTERN FIGURES FOR WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE WERE TOO HIGH -- AS THE EAST HAD CLAIMED THEY WERE -- THE WESTERN REPS WOULD BE PREPARED TO MAKE ADJUSTMENTS IN THE WEST'S OVERALL REDUCTION PROPOSALS.

46. FRG REP SAID THAT SINCE THE WEST HAD OFFERED TO EXCHANGE DATA ON AIR FORCE MANPOWER AS WELL AS GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA, THE ALLIES CONSIDERED IT WOULD ADD TO THE CLARITY OF SUCH AN EXCHANGE TO HAVE AN AGREED DEFINITION OF WHAT EACH SIDE MEANT BY GROUND FORCES, SO THAT PARTICIPANTS COULD DISTINGUISH BETWEEN GROUND AND AIR FORCES WHEN DATA WERE COMPARED. THE EAST HAD ARGUED THAT

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A DISCUSSION OF DATA SHOULD BE DEPENDENT ON PRIOR AGREEMENT ON THE TYPES OF FORCES TO BE REDUCED. WHILE THIS MIGHT BE THE EAST'S PREFERENCE, THE WESTERN SIDE DID NOT CONSIDER THIS PRECONDITION A REASONABLE ONE. THE ALLIED POSITION WAS ONE OF CONTINUED OPPOSITION TO THE INCLUSION OF AIR FORCES IN REDUCTIONS, WHILE THE EAST'S POSITION WAS THAT THEY WISHED TO INCLUDE AIR FORCES IN REDUCTIONS. HOWEVER, THE WEST WAS READY TO DISCUSS DATA ON ALL MAN-

POWER IN THE AREA, EXCEPT OF COURSE THE NAVY. THE ALLIES DID NOT CONSIDER A PRODUCTIVE ATTITUDE TO MAKE DISCUSSION OF DATA CONDITIONAL ON PRIOR WESTERN AGREEMENT TO THE EAST'S PROGRAM.

47. FRG REP SAID THE WEST THOUGHT IT MADE SENSE TO BEGIN DISCUSSIONS NOW ON THIS PROBLEM OF DATA. THE REASON, AS THE REP HAD INDICATED, WAS THAT A COMMON UNDERSTANDING ON WHAT THE EXISTING FORCE LEVELS WERE COULD HAVE IMPORTANT IMPLICATIONS FOR REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE SIZE OF REDUCTIONS. IT COULD MAKE IT EASIER TO AGREE ON REDUCTIONS. THUS, THE DISCUSSION THE WEST PROPOSED COULD HELP TO MOVE THE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD. FRG REP REPEATED THAT THE RECIPROCAL DISCUSSION OF DATA THE WEST WAS PROPOSING WOULD BE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE POSITION OF EITHER SIDE. THE WESTERN OFFER TO EXCHANGE DATA ON ALL FORCES MADE THIS CLEAR. NATURALLY, THE ALLIES WOULD CONTINUE TO ARGUE THE MERITS OF THEIR OVERALL PROGRAM AND NO DOUBT, THE EAST WOULD WISH TO DO THE SAME.

AS THE EASTERN REPS WERE WELL AWARE, AN IMPORTANT ASPECT OF THE WEST'S PROGRAM WAS THE FOCUS ON GROUND FORCES.

48. FRG REP SAID THE WEST BELIEVED THAT THIS POSITION WAS JUSTIFIED. AS THE ALLIED REPS HAD POINTED OUT LAST TIME, THE AGGREGATE AIR FORCE MANPOWER TOTALS ON THE TWO SIDES WERE VERY NEARLY EQUAL, THOUGH WITH A SLIGHT WARSAW PACT SUPERIORITY. THE IMPLICATION OF THIS, AS THE WEST ALSO HAD POINTED OUT, WAS THAT THE INCLUSION OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN THE REDUCTION BASE WOULD NOT NARROW THE  
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OVERALL MANPOWER DISPARITY, BUT WOULD IN FACT SLIGHTLY INCREASE IT. THE WEST BELIEVED THAT, FOR THIS REASON, AS WELL AS FOR THE OTHER, MORE IMPORTANTLY MILITARY REASONS THE ALLIES HAD PREVIOUSLY GIVEN THE EAST, IT WOULD BE POINTLESS TO REDUCE AIR MANPOWER ALONG WITH GROUND MANPOWER. THUS, WHILE THE WESTERN REPS WERE WILLING TO EXCHANGE AIR PERSONNEL TOTALS FOR BOTH SIDES, THE ALLIES SAW NO MERIT IN INCLUDING AIR PERSONNEL IN AN AGREEMENT SINCE THEIR INCLUSION WOULD NOT CONTRIBUTE TO THE AIM OF ACHIEVING A MORE STABLE FORCE RELATIONSHIP IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

49. KHLESTOV SAID THAT HE WISHED TO PRESENT A BRIEF COMMENT ON ONE POINT JUST RAISED BY FRG REP. FRG REP HAD USED THE CONCEPT OF PRECONDITION IN A DIFFERENT WAY FROM THE WAY

EAST USED THIS TERM. FOR EXAMPLE, WHEN WESTERN REPS SIAD THAT WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE ABLE TO UNDERTAKE A COMMITMENT TO REDUCE IN THE SECOND PHASE IN THE EVENT OF A SATISFACTORY FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT. IT WAS HIS UNDERSTANDING OF THIS CONDITION THAT, IF A CERTAIN PRECONDITION WAS ACCEPTED BY THE EAST AS TO THE CONTENT OF THE PHASE I AGREEMENT, THEN THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE WILLING TO UNDERTAKE A COMMITMENT. EAST HAD NOT MADE ANY PRECONDITION OF THIS TYPE IN REGARD TO DISCUSSION OF DATA. IF THEY WANTED, WESTERN REPRESENT-

TIVES COULD CALL ANY VIEW EXPRESSED BY EAST A PRECONDITION, BUT THIS WAS NOT ACCURATE USAGE. FRG REP HAD STRESSED THE VIEW OF WESTERN COUNTRIES THAT IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO HAVE A COMMON DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES AND TO EXCHANGE DATA. EASTERN REPS HAD ALREADY EMPHASIZED THEIR VIEW THAT THE MAIN TASK AT THE MOMENT WAS TO FIND ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS OF PRINCIPLE. THE FIRST OF THESE, PARTICIPANTS HAD ALREADY AGREED, WAS THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. EASTERN REPS HAD ADVANCED REASONS WHY THEY HELD THIS POSITION. THESE REASONS CONTINUED IN EFFECT. THEREFORE, EASTERN REPS BELIEVED THAT THE QUESTION OF DATA SHOULD BE TAKEN UP ONLY WHEN

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 AEC-05 CIAE-00 EUR-12 H-01 INR-05 IO-10

L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-05

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P 131715Z NOV 74  
FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 620  
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY  
INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY



AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY  
USNMR SHAPE  
USCINCEUR PRIORITY

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PARTICIPANTS REACHED THAT STAGE. THE MAIN THING NEEDED FOR REDUCTIONS WAS FOR PARTICIPANTS TO GET ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS OF PRINCIPLE. THE FIRST OF THESE WAS THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. THE EASTERN VIEW AS THAT DATA SHOULD NOT BE DISCUSSED FOR THE SAKE OF DATA, BUT TO DEFINE REDUCTIONS. WHEN PARTICIPANTS REACHED THAT STAGE, THE EAST WOULD BE READY TO DISCUSS IT AND TO DISCUSS HOW IT SHOULD BE DISCUSSED. AS FOR THE VIEWS EXPRESSED BY HIS WESTERN COLLEAGUES THAT THE DATA PRODUCED

SO FAR COULD BE CHANGED, IT WAS UP TO THEM TO DO THAT IF THERE WAS REASON FOR IT AND THEY COULD DO THAT ON THEIR OWN, AS THEY HAD DONE IN THE PAST.

50. FRG REP SAID HE WISHED TO MAKE A BRIEF REPLY. WESTERN REPS WERE READY TO EXCHANGE DATA ON ALL FORCES IN THE AREA, AIR AND GROUND. THIS WAS TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THEY WERE NOT TRYING TO PREJUDICE THE QUESTION OF WHAT FORCES SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN REDUCTIONS. KHLESTOV HAD JUST SAID THAT THE MAIN TASK WAS TO AGREE ON ISSUES  
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OF PRINCIPLE. ALLIED REPS KNEW THAT THE EAST WOULD LIKE THE WEST TO ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL NUMBERS OR EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS. BUT EASTERN REPS KNEW THAT THIS POSITION WAS CONTRARY TO WESTERN VIEWS. SO IF THE EAST WISHED TO MAKE PROGRESS ON THE REDUCTIONS, IT WAS NECESSARY TO START IN A CONCRETE WAY BY AN EXCHANGE OF DATA. THIS WOULD MAKE IT EASIER TO AGREE ON REDUCTIONS. SO IT WAS NOT CORRECT TO SAY THAT THE WEST WISHED TO DISCUSS DATA FOR ITS OWN SAKE. THE REASON WAS TO MAKE PROGRESS TOWARDS AGREEMENT ON REDUCTIONS. AMBASSADOR KHLESTOV HAD SAID THAT DATA COULD BE DISCUSSED WHRN PARTICIPANTS REACHED "THAT STAGE" BUT IT STILL WAS NOT CLEAR TO FRG REP WHEN "THAT STAGE" WOULD BE REACHED. WHAT WAS "THAT STAGE?" IT LOOKED TO HIM AS THOUGH THAT WORD WAS ANOTHER WORD FOR WARSAW PACT PRECONDITIONS. ALLIED REPS WERE CONVINCED THAT THEIR DATA WERE CORRECT. BUT IF EAST HAD OBJECTIVE EVIDENCE THAT THESE FIGURES WERE WRONG, ALLIED REPS WOULD CONSIDER THIS EVIDENCE. BOTH SIDES WOULD HAVE TO DISCUSS DATA IF THEY WISHED TO MAKE PROGRESS ON REDUCTIONS.

51. SMIRNOVSKY SAID THAT ALLIED REPS WERE TRYING TO EMPHASIZE THAT THEY WERE READY TO EXCHANGE DATA AND DISCUSS DEFINITIONS. THEY SAID THAT THIS WAS IMPORTANT FOR PROGRESS. ALLIED REPS SHOULD UNDERSTAND WHAT WAS IMPORTANT FOR PROGRESS WAS FOR WESTERN COUNTRIES TO ASSUME SPECIFIC

OBLIGATIONS. THE UK AND CANADA AFTER MONTHS OF NEGOTIATIONS HAD STILL NOT STATED THEIR READINESS TO MAKE COMMITMENTS ON A SPECIFIC AMOUNT AND TIMING OF REDUCTIONS. THE EAST HAD FROM THE BEGINNING CLEARLY STATED WHAT SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS IT WAS WILLING TO ASSUME. THE EAST STILL DID NOT KNOW THE SAME INFORMATION AS REGARDS THE WEST. THIS WAS WHAT HAD HELD UP PROGRESS IN THE TALKS. EASTERN READINESS TO EXCHANGE SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS WAS CLEAR TO THE WEST. WESTERN RELUCTANCE TO DO THIS WAS WHAT HAD HELD UP PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

52. IT WAS AGREED TO HOLD THE NEXT SESSION ON NOVEMBER 19. THE WEST WILL BE HOST. RESOR

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## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** GROUND FORCES, MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 13 NOV 1974  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** golinofr  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1974MBFRV00412  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
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**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
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**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** MBFR VIENNA 411  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** golinofr  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 27 MAR 2002  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <27 MAR 2002 by kelleyw0>; APPROVED <24 MAY 2002 by golinofr>  
**Review Markings:**

Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
30 JUN 2005

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** MBFR: INFORMAL SESSION WITH EASTERN REPS NOVEMBER 12, 1974  
**TAGS:** PARM, US, XT, UR, NATO  
**To:** STATE DOD  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005